| 讲座简介： | Preventive war arises from the fear of future power shifts that may threaten the status quo. This paper investigates the dynamics of preventive war in the context of endogenous power shifts, where changes in power result from states' strategic decisions, through a lab experiment and a representative survey. We explore how rising states can avert conflict by adopting containment or commitment policies. Containment involves halting the power shift to maintain the current balance of power, while commitment entails making binding future offers even after the power shift occurs. Our findings reveal that while both policies effectively reduce the likelihood of preventive war, rising states significantly prefer commitment to containment. Additionally, declining states often opt for costly coercive containment measures rather than relying on rising states' self-containment. These patterns are consistent across both our controlled experimental setting and broader public opinions. Our study contributes to the understanding of conflict prevention by highlighting the complexities and limitations of strategic reassurance in the face of endogenously shifting power. |
