| 杂志 | Journal of Economics Dynamics
|
| 作者 | Jason Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout |
| 正文 | We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algo- rithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff-increasing opportunities systematically; how- ever, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms’ payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types does not vary significantly. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans’ and algorithms’ action choice propor- tions that is suggestive of the algorithms’ best response correspondences. |
| JEL-Codes： | C72 C92 C81 |
| 关键词： | Learning, Repeated games, Experiments, Simulation |
